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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2011, the British newspaper The Guardian reported
that journalists and private investigators working for Rupert
Murdoch's tabloid News of the World had hacked into the mobile
phone messages of teenage murder victim Milly Dowler after her
reported abduction in 2002, thereby giving her parents and friends
the false hope that she had accessed her phone and was still alive. 2
While journalistic "dark arts"-such as phone hacking, covert
surveillance, blagging3-had been used by the British tabloid press
vis-A-vis celebrities and public persons for some time without
triggering much press interest or public outrage, the Dowler story
enraged the entire British public, regardless of class or newspaper
preference.
4
The results of the phone-hacking scandal included the closure of
the News of the World;5 the payment by News Corporation, the
tabloid's parent, of almost $400 million in settlements and
litigation fees resulting from private civil actions brought by
phone-hacking victims; 6 continuing prosecutorial inquiries into the
2 Nick Davies & Amelia Hill, Missing Milly Dowler's Voicemail Was Hacked by News of
the World, THE GUARDIAN (July 4, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/julO4milly-
dowler-voicemail-hacked-news-of-world.
3 As used in the Leveson Report, "blagging" refers generally to the use of deception in order
to access otherwise unavailable information. LEVESON REPORT, Vol I, supra note 1, at 11.
4 See, e.g., THE LEVESON INQUIRY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICE AND ETHICS
OF THE PRESS, 2012, H.C. 779, Executive Summary, at 9 (U.K.) [hereinafter LEVESON
REPORT, Executive Summary] (stating that there was an immediate public outcry that
followed the news that News of the World had hacked Milly Dowler's mobile phone);
LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra note 1, at 270 (stating that the inquiry resulted from the
"wide scale public revulsion at the.., intercepting of messages left on the mobile telephone
of Milly Dowler"); THE LEVESON INQUIRY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICE AND
ETHICS OF THE PRESS, 2012, H.C. 780-II, Vol. II, at 547 (U.K.) [hereinafter LEVESON
REPORT, Vol. II] ('The revelation of [the Milly Dowler] story rightly shocked the public
conscious in a way that other stories of phone hacking may not have, but it also gave
momentum to growing calls for light to be shed on an unethical and unlawful practice of
which there were literally thousands of victims."); cf. Tim Luckhurst, Read All About It:
Britons Have Always Loved Scandal, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2011), http://www.theguardi
an.com/commentisfree/2011/may/25/scandal-twitter-popular-press (describing the history of
British Tabloid coverage of the famous and powerful).
5 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, 28, at 9.
6 See News Corp's Phone Hacking Costs: $382 Million, HUFF. POST (Sept. 24, 2013,
9:52 AM), http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2013/09/24/news-corp-phone-hacking-costs_n_39815
12.html (describing the company's extensive legal fees).
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activities of other tabloid newspapers; 7 the commencement of
criminal trials against high-profile tabloid editors;8 and Prime
Minister David Cameron's appointment of Lord Justice Brian
Leveson to conduct a wide-ranging independent public inquiry into
the culture, practices, and ethics of the newspaper industry in
Britain.9
Although the issue did not receive extensive press attention in
the United States, the year-long Leveson Inquiry culminated in an
almost 2,000-page indictment of British press culture-with
respect not only to newsgathering, but also to editorial and
publication practices. The resulting Leveson Report, issued in
November 2012, recommended the establishment of a new,
powerful press self-regulatory entity backed by statute, 10 as well
as a journalistic realignment of the balance between the public
interest and privacy.11 After a year of acrimonious negotiation,
conducted in the shadow of the Leveson Report, between the
British government and the newspaper industry, the Queen
approved a government-backed Royal Charter on Self-Regulation
of the Press. 12  The Royal Charter creates a framework for
supervised self-regulation and effectuates the Leveson Report's
recommendations.
7 See, e.g., Gavriel Hollander, Trinity Mirror Facing Investigation Over Whether it is
'Criminally Liable' for Phone-Hacking, PRESS GAZETTE (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.pressg
azette.co.uk/trinity-mirror-tells-stock-market-sunday-mirror-under-investigation-phone-hack
ing (announcing the investigation of the Sunday Mirror).
8 See Michael Holden & Kate Holton, High-Profile British Phone-Hacking Trial Begins,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/28/us-britain-hacking-idU
SBRE99ROF620131028 (describing the charges brought against Murdoch's former
newspaper chief); Phone Hacking Trial and Social Media: Reports and Resources,
INFORRM'S BLOG (Dec. 4, 2013), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/12/04/phone-hacking-tri
al-and-social-media-reports-and-resources/ (providing links to social media coverage of
phone-hacking trial of eight defendants, including former News of the World editors
Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson).
9 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra note 1, at 3-6 (providing the Prime Minister's
statement to the House of Commons regarding the appointment of Lord Justice Brian
Leveson and the scope of the inquiry).
10 See LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 32-35 (summarizing the
functions and powers of the regulatory body).
11 See id. at 24 ("I have recommended changes in the law to remove unnecessary
procedural red tape and provide for a fairer balance between the public interest in freedom
of expression and the public interest in personal information privacy.").
12 See infra Part I.c (describing the post-Leveson developments, including the Royal
Charter).
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While Britain is not alone in its recent exploration of ways to
engender a "responsible" press,13 it serves as a useful example of
the unexpected ripple effects of such initiatives. Developments
such as press reforms hewing to the Leveson Report threaten
press freedom not just locally in the United Kingdom, but also in
the United States. They bring into sharp relief the two sides of
globalization vis-A-vis the press: on the one hand, the globalizing
reach of journalism, and on the other, the possible globalization of
journalism regulation.
British press reform may invite British courts to impose
liability on American publishers in connection with their online
journalism or the content and activities of their foreign media
properties, foreseeably leading to a chilling effect on U.S.-based
press. At a minimum, concerns about such developments might
encourage American news organizations with online presences to
join British self-regulatory organizations "voluntarily." Further,
trans-border media ownership and partnership, the employment of
British-trained journalists by U.S. media, and the increasing
impetus for global institutional collaboration by news
organizations are also likely to engender changes in the
journalistic and editorial practices of the U.S. press. 14 Likewise,
American courts seeking to recalibrate privacy and measure press
behavior against media industry norms can import lessons from
British press regulation to the United States, with insufficient
attention to cultural translation and contextualization. There are
13 Other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have recently
investigated press practices as well. See generally Terry Flew & Adam Glen Swift, Regulating
Journalists? The Finkelstein Review, the Convergence Review, and News Media Regulation in
Australia, 2 J. APPIED J. & MEDIA STUD. 181 (2013) (reviewing recent Australian developments);
Steven Price, New Zealand Media Regulation: No One-Stop Media Regulator, INFoRRM'S BLOG
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/07/new-zealand-media-regulation-no-one-
stop-media-regulator-steven-price/ (cataloguing media regulation developments in New Zealand).
Press reform has been a live issue elsewhere in Europe as well. For example, last year, a report
to the European Commission by the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism called
for EU-level harmonization of media and journalism. High Level Group on Media Freedom and
Pluralism, A Free and Pluralistic Media to Sustain European Democracy 33 (Jan. 21, 2013),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/high-level-group-media-freedom-and-pluralism;
see also R6gis Bismuth, Standards of Conduct for Journalists Under Europe's First Amendment,
8 FiRST AMEND. L. REv. 283 (2010) (discussing European conception of newsworthiness).
14 See infra Part I.B (describing how British press standards could be exported to the
United States through "soft harmonization").
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already judicial and scholarly voices in the United States calling
for press improvement in the public interest.
15
However well-intentioned, appeals to treat journalists like
accountants--effectively subject to professional licensing and
liability for violation of professional standards-should be opposed.
Continuing commitment to American First Amendment
exceptionalism is particularly important today because there
needs to be a place where the global press, acting in the public
interest, has a chance to circumvent authoritarian reporting limits
elsewhere. The rise of the national security state and government
censorship world-wide make this imperative. 16 Journalism under
the shadow of surveillance deserves a safe place in which to
flourish and evolve its own standards. The professional,
commercial U.S. press, already weakened by significant economic
trials and more timid in its challenges to government power than
it might be,17 should not be further deterred from engaging in
accountability journalism in the public interest by direct or
indirect incorporation of journalism norms adopted in response to
regulation elsewhere.
Even in Britain, concerns about tabloid phone hacking should
not stimulate such regulation as is likely to chill the journalism of
the entire press sector.18 Nevertheless, if press regulation tracking
the Leveson approach does ultimately triumph in the United
Kingdom, it should be operationalized with modesty and restraint.
British courts should consider the benefits of press-friendly
jurisdiction and choice-of-law analyses in online press cases
involving American news organizations. The British press
15 For several articles advocating regulation of the press, see sources cited infra note 101.
16 See generally FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF
INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA (Sanja Kelly, Sarah Cook & Mai Truong eds., 2012)
(providing "a comprehensive study of internet freedom in 47 countries around the globe"
and finding that "many authoritarian states have taken various measures to filter, monitor,
or otherwise obstruct free speech online").
11 See SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40700, THE U.S. NEWSPAPER
INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION (2009), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1639&context=key workplace ('The U.S. newspaper industry is suffering
through what could be its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Advertising
revenues are plummeting due to the severe economic downturn, while readership habits are
changing as consumers turn to the Internet for free news and information.').
'8 It is beyond the scope of this Article to elaborate the dangers of the Leveson approach
to press self-regulation in Britain. Further forthcoming work will describe and analyze the
threats to local British expressive values posed by the press reform movement in Britain.
912 [Vol. 48:907
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regulator should draft and enforce its code of ethics with a view to
the increasingly complex digital news eco-system and the
worldwide atmosphere of intensified government secrecy. In the
United States, courts and commentators should resist importing
influences from regulatory reform abroad, lest they
unintentionally further enfeeble the American press and deny a
journalistic refuge for democracy-enhancing reporting.
Part II of this Article describes the Leveson Inquiry and its
resulting Report, as well as the status of press reform in the
United Kingdom currently. Part III discusses the direct and
indirect effects on the American press of pending British press
self-regulation. Part IV sketches why chilling effects on the U.S.
press would be particularly threatening to the public interest
today.
II. THE LEVESON INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND
ETHICS OF THE PRESS
The Leveson Inquiry was commissioned by the Prime Minister
in July 2011 with a wide-ranging scope, 19 which Justice Leveson
himself characterized as "almost breathtaking in its width."
20
After a year of taking testimony, Justice Leveson issued a four-




The Report identified systemic cultural problems with the
operation of the press (and particularly the tabloid newspapers) on
three fronts: newsgathering, reporting/publishing, and the attitude
of the press.22 Newsgathering too often involved not just phone
hacking, but also covert surveillance, blagging, deception,
excessive persistence (through tactics such as door-stepping,
chases by photographers, and insistent phone calls), illegal trade
19 LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra note 1, at 4-5 (describing the broad Terms of Reference
of the Inquiry).
20 Id. at 12.
21 See generally id. at 3-48 (describing the inquiry); id. at 49-51 (describing the Report).
22 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. II, supra note 4, at 592-693 (discussing in-depth the
cultural problems of the operations of the press).
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in personal information, and some instances of police bribery "in
circumstances where it is extremely difficult to see any public
interest justification."
23
As for reporting, the press sometimes "recklesslly]...
prioriti[zed] sensational stories, almost irrespective of the harm
[they could cause] . . ., all the while heedless of the public
interest";24 published "private information without consent";
25
showed "reckless disregard for accuracy"; and engaged in
misrepresentation, embellishment, and distortion.
26
With respect to the press's attitude in response to complaints,
the Report identified a lack of respect for privacy and dignity;27 "a
cultural tendency within parts of the press vigorously to resist or
dismiss complainants almost as a matter of course";28 a refusal to
investigate even charges of systemic criminality;29 a propensity of
newspapers under attack to attack their attackers, thereby
intimidating and deterring complainants; 30 a hesitancy to break
ranks and criticize other papers' practices;31 and a failure of
governance and compliance systems that might have averted
misbehavior. 32 The Report highlighted the press's lack of remorse
and defensive failure to self-examine as factors exacerbating the
underlying newsgathering and reporting errors it described.
33
The existing voluntary self-regulatory regime under the Press
Complaints Commission (PCC)34 was deemed ineffective to address
these problems: Lord Justice Leveson excoriated the PCC for its
press-protective attitude, lack of independence from the industry,
23 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 10.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 11.
27 Id. at 10 (speaking specifically about the News of the World).
28 Id. at 11.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id. at 10-11, 39 (noting that News of the World was "prepared to conduct surveillance
on solicitors acting for claimants in phone hacking litigation").
31 See id. at 8.
32 See id. at 9-11.
33 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. II, supra note 4, at 704-17 (discussing the press's defensive
attitude towards critics and unwillingness to apologize in response to complaints).
34 The PCC is a self-regulatory body charged with maintaining and promoting a
professional Code of Practice by journalists, and dealing with complaints about breaches of
the Code by the press. See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra note 1, at 219-46.
914 [Vol. 48:907
2014] JOURNALISM STANDARDS AND "THE DARK ARTS" 915
"woefully inadequate"35 remedies, and failure to act as an effective
regulator.
36
B. THE LEVESON REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to envision the future of press regulation, the Report
began by identifying the following requisites for an effective
system: "effectiveness, in terms of credibility and durability with
both press and the public; fairness and objectivity of standards;
independence, transparency of enforcement and compliance;
effective and credible powers together with remedies; and the need
for sufficient funding taking into account the market
constraints."37  The Report sketched out a proposed independent
self-regulatory regime designed to accomplish those goals and
invited the industry to effectuate it.38
The Leveson model centers on the establishment of an
independent regulatory body tasked "with the dual roles of
promoting high standards of journalism and protecting the rights
of individuals."39 The body would be governed by an independent
board (the Board), whose chair and members would be appointed
by an appointment panel, the members of which would be
independent of both the industry and government and selected in
a independent way.40 While "the Board should include people with
relevant expertise, there should be no serving editors on the
Board"41 and its majority should be independent of the press.42
"The [Boards] chair should be clearly and demonstrably
independent of the press," meaning that "he or she should have no
current, or recent, affiliation with any particular press
35 LEVESON REPORT, Vol. II, supra note 4, at 12.
36 Id. (discussing the ways in which the "PCC has failed"). The PCC's failure to engage in
serious investigation of phone-hacking complaints reflected the Commission's utter lack of
credibility, according to the Leveson Report.
37 Id. at 13 (reiterating that these criteria had not been challenged).
38 See id. at 32-46 (summarizing the recommendation for the regulatory model). The
Leveson Report discusses and ultimately rejects the industry-backed offer for a new
regulatory system proposed by Lords Hunt and Black. Id. at 13-14.
39 Id. at 14.
40 Id. at 32; see also THE LEVESON INQUIRY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICE
AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS, 2012, H.C. 780-IV, Vol. IV, at 1760 (U.K.) [hereinafter LEVESON
REPORT, Vol. IV] (describing the appointment process details).
41 See LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 32.
42 Id. at 33.
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organisation."43 The Board's operations should be funded by the
industry, via multi-year agreements to be negotiated well in
advance, in order to limit funder influence on the Board's
activities.44
The new self-regulatory body would have a multitude of roles,
including: creating and enforcing a standards code (the Code);
defining and issuing guidance on the public interest and the Code;
requiring appropriate internal governance processes; enabling
whistle-blowing; adjudicating individual complaints; investigating,
on its own initiative, serious or systemic breaches of the Code and
failures to comply with its directives; providing pre-publication
advice to editors; directing the nature, extent and placement of
apologies; and operating an arbitration service to deal with civil
law claims. 45 In drafting the Code, the board could be advised by a
Code Committee that could include serving editors.
46
In turn, the Code to be adopted by the Board "[m]ust take into
account the importance of freedom of speech, the interests of the
public (including the public interest in detecting or exposing crime
or serious impropriety, protecting public health and safety and
preventing the public from being seriously misled) and the rights
of individuals."
47
As for complaints, in contrast to the PCC's limited jurisdiction
to hear complaints only from the victims of press breaches, the
new Board would have the power "to hear complaints wherever
they come from" including "a representative group affected by the
alleged breach, or a third party seeking to ensure accuracy of
published information."
48
The Board would have the right to require remedial action such
as corrections or apologies; the prerogative to require compilation
and public availability of Code compliance data;49 the authority to
43 LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1759.
44 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 33.
45 Id. at 33-34; LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1763-66.
46 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 33.
47 LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1763. The Code "must cover standards of:
(a) conduct, especially in relation to the treatment of other people in the process of obtaining
material; (b) appropriate respect for privacy where there is no sufficient public interest
justification for breach and (c) accuracy, and the need to avoid misrepresentation." Id.
48 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 33.
49 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1766. There would also be reporting
requirements for the Board. Id.
916 [Vol. 48:907
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investigate systemic or serious breaches; and "the power to impose
appropriate and proportionate sanctions, (including financial
sanctions up to 1% of turnover with a maximum of £1m)... for
serious or systemic breaches of the Code or governance
requirements of the body."
' 0
The Leveson Report also made specific recommendations for
consideration by the body. For instance, it suggested a clearer
statement of the standards to be expected of editors and
journalists than is in the current Editors' Code of Practice adopted
under the auspices of the PCC. 51 It indicated that the body
"should make it clear that newspapers will be held strictly
accountable, under their standards code, for any material that
they publish, including photographs (however sourced)." 52  It
recommended that the new self-regulatory body should provide a
service to warn the press, broadcasters, and photographers "when
an individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press
intrusion."53 The press should not ordinarily release the names of
arrestees or suspects. 54 It suggested that the code be amended to
allow the body "to intervene in cases of allegedly discriminatory
reporting,... reflect[ing] the spirit of equalities legislation. ' 55 In
addition to requiring the body to "provide guidance on the
interpretation of the public interest that justifies what would
otherwise constitute a breach of the Code,"56 the Report
recommended that when the public interest justification is to be
relied on to excuse a breach of the Code, "a record should be
available of the factors weighing against and in favour of
publication, along with a record of the reasons for the conclusions
reached."57  Wherever possible, the Report recommended
encouraging the press to be transparent as to the identity of
sources used for stories, and to provide easily accessible links to
50 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 34.
51 LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1762-63 (discussing the problems with the
old code and the need for a clearer code).
52 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 38.
53 Id. at 37.
54 Id. at 22 (providing an exception "where there may be a risk to the public").
55 Id.
56 Id. at 38.
57 Id.
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publicly available data. 58  Source identification would include
providing information to help readers assess the reliability of the
source. 5
9
As the new regulatory body would lack credibility if the
majority of newspaper publishers did not subscribe, the Leveson
Report also described "carrot-and-stick" incentives designed to
promote participation. 60  The principal carrot was that
membership in the regulatory body would entitle claimants to use
a "fair, fast and inexpensive arbitration service" to be operated
under the auspices of the body.61 Given the expense of litigation
and the possibility that the losing press defendant will be liable
not just for damages but also for the winning party costs, Justice
Leveson predicted that the arbitral option would be financially
attractive to the press.62 Claimants would have incentives to
arbitrate as well.63 Free for complainants, the availability of the
arbitral arm would be considered by courts to weigh against
wealthy claimants who choose to go to court instead, possibly
subjecting them to claims for costs.
64
On the "stick" side of the model, the Report provided that
newspapers choosing not to join the new body would be
disadvantaged in three ways. First, they would not have access to
a cheap, expert, and rapid arbitral process. 65 Second, in court for
defamation, breach of confidence, or other media tort cases, they
would be liable for exemplary damages if they lost.66 Third, even if
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 35-36 (summarizing the benefits of membership in the regulatory body).
61 Id. at 35.
62 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1513-14 (describing the benefits of the
arbitration process to a publisher and its strength as an incentive).
6 See LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 35 ("[A member can]
request the court ... to have regarded to the availability of the arbitration system when
considering claims for costs incurred by a claimant who could have used the arbitration
service.").
64 Id.
65 Cf. id. (noting that membership provides members with access to the arbitration
service).
66 See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1500-01 (describing the current
process for claimants suing the press, and the costs that would be incurred by either party
when they win or lose).
918 [Vol. 48:907
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they won, they would nevertheless be ineligible to receive cost
recovery as is currently available.
67
In its most controversial aspect, the Leveson Report
recommended parliamentary enactment of a statutory
underpinning that would identify the legitimate requirements of
an independent self-regulatory body and "provide a mechanism to
recognise and certify that a new body meets them."6  The
requirements for recognition would be the Leveson Report's
recommendations.6 9  An independent recognition body would
assess-both at its inception and thereafter as well-whether the
self-regulatory body was designed and operated to satisfy the
statutory requisites.
70
Finally, the Leveson Report addressed the available options
should the industry not "rise to the challenge"71 of establishing a
regulator along the lines it recommended, including the possibility
of providing a "backstop regulator"72 via legislation.
67 See LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 35-36 (noting that when a
newspaper fails to become a member and thereby denies a losing claimant access to the
arbitration system, "it would be inappropriate for the claimant to be expected to pay the
costs incurred in defending the action"). Leveson recommended both revisions to existing
law to effectuate the carrot-and-stick regime, and also changes to other substantive and
procedural rules thought to be overly hospitable to the press. See, e.g., LEVESON REPORT,
Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1810-11 (addressing some provisions of the U.K. data protection
regime that serve as particular protections for journalistic activity as well as proposing
increases to the Information Commissioner's powers). Leveson also recommended changes
to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 that would ease police access to journalistic
material. See id. at 1813 (stating that journalistic material should only be considered
confidential for the purposes of the Act if it was acquired through "an enforceable or lawful
undertaking').
The costs and exemplary damages incentive provisions recommended in the Leveson
Report were formally enacted by Parliament as part of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013.
Crimes and Courts Act, 2013, c.22, §§ 34-42, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uklukp
ga2013/22/contents/enacted; see also Charlie Potter, Press Regulation: All You Need to
Know, 24 BRIT. J. REV. 15, 15-22 (2013) (describing the Leveson Report, the political
response, and the legal changes already undertaken as part of effectuating the Report's
recommendations).
68 LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 36.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 17.
72 See id.; see also LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1782 (articulating, but not
explicitly recommending, such a statutory regulator prior to an assessment of the press's
response to the Leveson Report's co-regulatory recommendations).
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C. POST-LEVESON DEVELOPMENTS
After the release of the Leveson Report, the British government
and newspapers engaged in negotiating press regulation in the
shadow of the Report. The parties proposed contending Royal
Charters that would guide the establishment of the new
regulator.7 3 On October 30, 2013, the press lost its battle when the
Queen approved the Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press,
extensively based on the Leveson Report recommendations and the
cross-party proposed Charter. 74
As provided in the Royal Charter, a Recognition Panel charged
with recognition of press industry self-regulators is currently being
established.75  The Recognition Panel is to be tasked with
73 In response to concerns about parliamentary involvement in press regulation, the
Cameron government proposed using the Royal Charter mechanism to effectuate the
recommendations of the Leveson Report. Lisa O'Caroll, Royal Charters: What Are They and
How Do They Work?, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/
dec07leveson-inquiry-royal-charter-history. Unlike the parliamentary process involved in
enacting legislation, Royal Charters are approved by the Queen upon recommendation of her
Privy Council. Id.
The proposed Royal Charter negotiated by the Liberals, the Conservatives, and the
Liberal Democrats-the cross-party charter-sought to execute the Leveson Report's
recommendations with fidelity. See Final Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press
(2013), available at https://www.gov.uklgovernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentda
ta/file/249783/FinalDraftRoyalCharterll_Oct_2013.pdf (providing the final cross-party
draft of the proposed Charter).
By contrast, the newspaper publishers proposed their own version of the Royal Charter.
See Draft Royal Charter for the Independent Self-Regulation of the Press, http://www.newspa
persoc.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/Draft-Independent-Royal-Charter-25-4-13.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2014). The publishers characterized their proposed Charter as addressing the failures
of prior self-regulation and responding to the Leveson Report's concerns, while posing fewer
threats to press independence than the cross-party proposal. Lynne Anderson, Newspaper
and Magazine Publishers Apply for Royal Charter on Press Regulation to Implement Leveson
Recommendation, NEWSPAPER SOC'Y (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/25/apr/
13/newspaper-and-magazine-publishers-apply-for-royal-charter-on-press-regulation-to-imple
ment.
14 Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.gov.uklgov
erment/uploads/systemluploads/attachmentdata/file254116/Final_RoyalCharter25_Octo
ber_2013_clean__Final_.pdf.
75 Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.gov.uklgove
rnmentuploadssystemuploads/attachment datafile/254116/Final-Royal-Charter 250Octo
ber_2013_clean__Final_.pdf; see also Press Self Regulation, THE COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC
APPOINTMENTS, http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/press-self-regu
lationl (last updated Feb. 7, 2014); Roy Greenslade, Words of Leveson Open to Interpretation
Amid the Mud-Slinging, STANDARD (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.standard.co.uk/business/me
dialwords-of-leveson-open-to-interpretation-amid-the-mudslinging-9092913.html.
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determining whether applications for recognition from press
regulators comply with the terms of the Charter by adequately
satisfying the Leveson criteria, reviewing whether regulators
granted recognition should continue to be certified, and reporting
on the success or failure of the recognition system.
76
In the meantime, the major newspaper publishers inaugurated
their own press regulator-the Independent Press Standards
Organisation (IPSO)77-purporting to comply with Leveson and to
be the "toughest regulator anywhere in the developed world,"'7
albeit with structural departures from the Leveson model.7 9 It is
reported that the great majority of British newspaper publishers
have signed contracts subscribing to IPSO.80
It may be, as recently predicted in the Economist, that the
politicians' Royal Charter will find no takers and press reform will
be deferred until after the 2015 general election.8' IPSO is not
likely to seek recognition under the Royal Charter regime.8 2 Yet, a
new self-regulatory option-IMPRESS (Independent Monitor for
the Press)-has recently been proposed as an alternative to
76 Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, Section 4, Functions 4.1.
77 IPSO: INDEPENDENT PRESS STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, http://ipso.co.uk/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2014).
78 Ian Burrell, Press Announces Timetable for 'Toughest Regulator in the World,'
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uklnews/media/press/press-annou
nces-timetable-for-toughest-regulator-in-the-world-8902402.html.
79 For a criticism of IPSO as insufficiently compliant with Leveson issued by a press
reform organization, see MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST, THE INDEPENDENT PRESS STANDARDS
ORGANISATION (IPSO), AN ASSESSMENT 4-4 (2013), available at http://mediastandardstrust.
orgfwp-content/uploads/downloads2013/ 11/MST-IPSO-Analysis-15-11 -13.pdf.
80 See Mark Sweeney, Press Regulation: Most National and Regional Newspapers Sign
Up to IPSO, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec05/
press-regulations-newspapers-sign-up-ipso ("More than 90% of national newspapers and
most regional publishers have signed up."). The Financial Times and the Guardian have
not yet done so, citing concerns about independence. Id.
81 Hold the Presses, ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/
britain21588910-battle-over-newspaper-regulation-rolls-long-grass-hold-presses ('The battle
has been postponed. It will be even more vicious when it rejoins.").
82 See, e.g., Dominic Ponsford, MP tells PCC Chair Lord Hunt: 'You're being paid £1 80k for
three days a week to shimmy and shift the sands,' PRESSGAZZETTE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.
pressgazette.co.uk/mp-tells-pcc-chair-lord-hunt-youre-being-paid-£ 180k-three-days-week-shi
mmy-and-shift-sands ("Publishers have said IPSO will not seek approval from the
independent recognition panel set up by Parliament under the terms of the Royal Charter').
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IPSO.3 If IMPRESS succeeds in attracting an adequate
subscriber base and seeking recognition from the Recognition
Panel, the press will face the chilling impact of exemplary
damages.8 4 Or, if another Milly Dowler-like press debacle is
revealed, something even more challenging to press freedom than
the Royal Charter regime is likely to emerge. While the ultimate
shape of press regulation is still unclear, the Leveson Report's
recommendations are likely to have a significant influence on
press reform. Because it will operate in the shadow of the
government's Royal Charter and other developing regulatory
options, even the press's own regulatory IPSO is likely to be far
less deferential to newspapers than was the PCC.
III. THE CROSS-ATLANTIC CHILL
Although some American journalists wrote a letter highlighting
the threat to press freedom posed by the Leveson proposals8 5 and
the New York Times covered the phone-hacking scandal,86 the U.S.
media as a whole treated the issue as a British matter. This is not
entirely surprising: despite the two countries' shared commitment
to democratic government and free expression, the history,
character, and law of the press in the United Kingdom and United
States differ significantly.8 7 As one columnist for The Guardian
83 See Lisa O'Carroll, Sir Harold Evans Backs Plan for New Press Regulator to Rival
IPSO, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/medial2013/dec/09/sir-ha
rold-evans-press-regulator-ipso-impress-project (describing IMPRESS).
84 The exemplary damages provisions of the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 are designed to
be triggered when a press regulator is established and submits to the Royal Charter
certification process by seeking official recognition from the Recognition Panel established
pursuant to the Royal Charter. See Crimes and Courts Act 2013, Sections 34-42, available
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted; see also Charlie Potter,
Press Regulation: All You Need to Know, 24 BRITISH J. REV., no. 2, 2013, at 15-23.
85 See Rowena Mason, American Journalists Urge David Cameron to Drop Leveson Press
Regulation Plans, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 3, 2103), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics996984
5/American-journalists-urge-David-Cameron-to-drop-Leveson-press-regulation-plans.html?fb
(reporting on the letter by the Campaign to Protect Journalists to Prime Minister Cameron
urging him to refrain from creating a new press regulator).
86 The New York Times's archives of articles regarding phone hacking and the Leveson
Report can be found at British Phone Hacking Scandal (Leveson Report), N.Y. TIMES, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/n/news-of-the-world/index.html
?8qa (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
81 On the legal side, the British press does not operate under constitutional protections
akin to the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. British newspapers have been subject to
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put it, "Leveson is peculiarly British, growing out of a long history
of press regulation, myriad class issues and the special and
outsized position of media proprietors in Britain .... I don't see it
being applicable or even comprehensible in the American
context."88 Nevertheless, even if the British media landscape can
be clearly distinguished from its American counterpart, and even
if the Leveson approach-or some variant of press regulation-
might be reasonable in the context of the particular structure of
the British press, its effects are unlikely to remain local to Britain.
Resulting chilling effects on the American press's activities can be
expected.
self-regulation under the PCC for two decades already. See LEVESON REPORT Vol. IV, supra
note 40, at 1517 (mentioning the creation of the PCC in 1991). Furthermore, although
Britain does not have a statutory privacy tort, the British envision the public interest in a
free press as part of a balance with other public interests. See id. at 1862-64 (discussing
privacy law in the United Kingdom). At least in Lord Justice Leveson's account, freedom of
the press is adequately maintained in Britain if the government does not impose prior
restraints on speech; subsequent punishment is far less of a problem. This, of course, is far
from the freedom envisioned for speech in the United States.
British and American newspaper cultures also differ in some important ways. The
American tabloids-such as the New York Daily News-differ from British "red-top" tabloid
papers both in their coverage and style. Perhaps because of its comparative timorousness,
the mainstream American newspaper press is not known for extensive use of journalistic
"dark arts," although the investigative press has relied on surreptitious reporting. See
generally BROOKE KROEGER, UNDERCOVER REPORTING: THE TRUTH ABOUT DECEPTION
(2012) (explaining that journalists have used undercover investigations to produce much of
the most valuable journalism over the past 150 years). Further, while British broadcasters
are statutorily required to be neutral in their news coverage, partisanship is expected in
British newspapers. See KAREN SANDERS & MARK HANNA, British Journalists, in THE
GLOBAL JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 220, 220 (David H. Weaver & Lars Willnat eds.,
2012). And British reporters are said to be tougher and to press harder questions than
their American counterparts. See Brian Reade, Pulp Friction: Why Only British Journalists
Ask Hard Questions of Celebrities, MIRROR (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
uk-news/brian-reade-on-why-only-british-journalists-1538197 ("[Tlhe British media holds
those in power to account more stringently than in any other country.").
88 Rob Tricehinelli, Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, Could American
Press Ever Be Subject to a Stateside Equivalent of the Leveson Inquiry?, THE NEWS MEDIA &
THE LAW, Winter 2013, at 15, available at http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/
news-media-law/news-media-and-law-winter-2013/could-american-press-ever-b.
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A. POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF BRITISH PRESS LAW TO AMERICAN
NEWS ORGANIZATIONS
From the New York Times, which purchased the former
International Herald Tribune,8 9 to the Huffington Post, which
operates www.huffingtonpost.co.uk, American news purveyors are
developing connections with British entities. In addition to its
British interests, Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. also owns Fox
Broadcasting and Dow Jones, the publisher of the Wall Street
Journal.90 Further integration of British and American media
interests can be expected, either through ownership or contractual
collaboration. All the major American newspapers, broadcasters,
and cable operators, not to mention other U.S. news and opinion
purveyors, have significant online presences and naturally seek to
expand their reach to global audiences, including in the United
Kingdom. 91
Given the exceptional character of U.S. constitutional
protection for speech and press, there is the looming possibility of
American publishers being held liable by British courts for their
online journalism or the content and activities of their foreign
media properties. Such courts could assert jurisdiction on the
basis of the online American press's British readership and
attempts to target British readers, and could thereafter apply
89 See Roy Greenslade, Why the New York Times is Moving on from the Herald Tribune,
Greenslade Blog, THE GUARDIAN (July 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/media/greensla
de/2013/jul]29/new.york-times-digital.media (discussing the acquisition of the International
Herald Tribunal by the New York Times).
90 Resources-CJR's Guide to What the Major Media Companies Own, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., available at http://www.cjr.orglresources?c=newscorp.
91 See Ed Pilkington, The New York Times's Jull Abramson: "he First Amendment is First
for a Reason," THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2013, 1:24 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/media/20
13/oct/13/new-york-times-jiU-abramson-first-amendment ("A third of [the New York Times's]
59 million unique monthly users live outside the US."). The obverse is true as well-British
newspapers, for example, have made significant inroads into the American news market-
with the British Daily Mail said to have become the world's most popular online newspaper.
See Will Oremus, The World's Most Popular Online Newspaper, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:44 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articlesbusiness/moneybox/2012/02/daily-mail-new-york-times-how-t
hebritishtabloidbecame_the world smostpopularonlinene wspaper_.html ('CThe world's
most popular newspaper is ... the Daily Mail."); see also Tony Rogers, British Newspaper
Websites Seek a Bigger Audience in America, ABOUT.COM JOURNALISM, http://journalism.abo
ut.com/od/trends/a/British-Newspaper-websites-Seek-A-Bigger-Audience-In-America.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (explaining how U.K newspaper websites seek to win over U.S.
readers).
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British law. This could lead to liability in circumstances where the
journalists would be more protected under U.S. law.92 Even
92 Of course, important issues of jurisdiction and choice of law arising in connection with
the transnational activities of online press entities have not yet been resolved. See, e.g.,
LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra note 1, at 177-79 (discussing the problems with "the
enforcement of law and regulation online"); David A. Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA.
J. INT'L L. 71, 77-85 (2012) (discussing issues posed by transnational cases in which two or
more countries can claim their law controls the outcome); Jan-Jaap Kuipers, Towards a
European Approach in the Cross-Border Infringement of Personality Rights, 12 GERMAN L.J.
1682-93 (2011) (analyzing the need to determine the law applicable to cross-border
infringements of personality). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to describe British
jurisdiction and choice-of-law developments with respect to the Internet in detail, the
possibility that American news organizations could be held liable on the basis of their online
reporting accessed in Britain appears non-trivial. The Internet "gives many defendants
wider presence than they otherwise would have," and "most countries now embrace
expansive ideas as to what contacts are sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction."
Anderson, supra, at 78. As for choice of law, some courts unilaterally apply forum law
without engaging in choice-of-law analysis. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Internet Defamation,
Freedom of Expression, and the Lessons of Private International Law for the United States,
14 Y.B. PRIVATE INT'L L. 181 (2013). Even when they do engage in choice-of-law analysis,
the outcome of the analysis is often unpredictable. Anderson, supra, at 79; see also Anna
Kadyshevich, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law for Online Publishers in Europe, 28 CoMM.
LAW. 13 (2012) (discussing a recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union
addressing jurisdiction and choice of law in privacy contexts).
The British Royal Charter's definition of those entities falling within its scope does not
significantly protect American online news organizations from the imposition of liability by
British courts applying British law. Its definition of a "relevant publisher"-based on the
definition in the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 (Final Royal Charter, supra note 74, § 1(b))
sch. 4-would include all major U.S. newspapers with online editions. Crimes and Courts
Act 2013, 2013 c. 22, § 41, Sch. 15, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uklukpga2013/
22/sectionl41/enacted.
Recently, a British court enjoined the Wall Street Journal from identifying the names of
possible British subjects of a multi-country financial fraud investigation. See News: SFO
Obtains Injunction to Prevent Publication of LIBOR Names in Wall Street Journal, INFORRM'S
BLOG (Oct. 19, 2013), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/19/news-sfo-obtains-injunctionto-
prevent-publication-of-libor-names-in-wall-street-journal (discussing injunction in LIBOR
investigation). Although the injunction expired shortly thereafter (see Cassell Bryan-Low &
Jenny Strasburg, Judge Allows Publication of Names in Libor Case, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21,
2013, 3:51 PM), http://online.wsj.com/newsarticles/SB100014240527023044021045791495002
82467112 (reporting that the British court decided not to renew the order four days after the
injunction)), its issuance in the first place reflects a different balance between press and other
interests than would likely prevail in the United States in similar situations. See Attorney
General to Warn Facebook and Twitter Users About Contempt of Court, GOV.UK (Dec. 4, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/attorney-general-to-warn-facebook-and-twitter-users-
about-contempt-of-court (noting Attorney General's decision to publish advisory notes "to help
inform the public about the legal pitfalls of commenting in a way which could be seen as
prejudicial to a court case or those involved").
Analogously, prior to the passage of the Defamation Act of 2013, British courts had
become a preferred venue for 'libel tourism" because of their willingness to exercise
jurisdiction over non-British defendants and to apply British defamation law even when the
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parties had limited connections with the British forum. For recent discussions of trans-
national libel cases, see generally Anderson, supra, and sources cited therein. See also Lili
Levi, The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 513 n.24 (2012)
(describing cases in which British courts exercised jurisdiction despite tenuous connections
with the British forum); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
88 (2012) (discussing European commissioner Reding's proposal to create the "right to be
forgotten" as new privacy right). Parallel developments for media invasions of privacy are
not inconceivable. See Stephen Bates, More SPEECH: Preempting Privacy Tourism, 33
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 379, 405 (2011) (arguing for extension of U.S. SPEECH Act's
provisions for non-enforcement of foreign defamation judgments to privacy cases as well).
Britain does not have a statutory privacy tort, having relied largely on the breach of
confidence doctrine to protect Britons' privacy interests. See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV,
supra note 40, at 1862-64 ("[Tjhe courts have demonstrated reluctance to develop a general
cause of action for the protection of privacy rights."). Yet, as the Leveson Report itself
indicates, British courts do balance the press's free expression interests with concerns about
their subjects' privacy interests to a greater degree than might be tolerable in U.S.
jurisprudence. Id.; see also Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 24-29 (2003)
(finding that Britain's remedy structure for arguable breaches of Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights was ineffective as required under Article 13(3)). If Britain
moves further toward statutory privacy tort protection, online American news organizations
might be at even greater risk.
The balance between the relative importance of free speech and privacy has been
developing in other parts of Europe in a manner different from that in the United States as
well. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the
Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125 (2012) (describing divergent definitions
of public figures and public interest in the United States and Europe). From attempts in
Europe to adopt a "right to be forgotten," to expansive European data protection law, there
appears to be an increasing divide between the United States and Europe on privacy matters.
See, e.g., Frances Robinson, European Parliament Acts Quickly to Pass Data-Protection Vote,
WSJ BLOGS (Oct. 21, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.combrussels/20 13/10/21/european-parli
ament-acts-quickly-to-pass-data-protection-vote/ (explaining that the amendments to a
possible new European law include a more workable version of the "right to be forgotten');
Case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, ECHR, App. No. 64569/09 (2013) (finding no violation of Article 10
in the Estonian court's holding that the large Estonian Internet news portal was not exempt
from defamation liability for readers' online comments). While the full implications of Delfi for
the future of the press jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights are still unclear,
many have characterized the decision as a significant threat to freedom of the press. See, e.g.,
Tim Worstall, Every Website That Accepts Comments Now Has a European Problem, FORBES
(Oct. 11, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstalY20l3/10/11/every-website-
that-accepts-comments-now-has-a-european-problem (explaining that under Delfi courts can
hold those who run websites liable for the defamatory comments that readers post of their
sites); Dirk Voorhoof, Treating a News Portal as a Publisher of Users' Comment May Have Far-
Reaching Consequences for Online Freedom of Expression, INFORRM'S BLOG (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/29/treating-a-news-portal-as-publisher-of-users-comme
nt-may-have-far-reaching-consequences-for-online-freedom-of-expression-dirk-voorhoof/
(stating that the Delfi case has been described as "a serious blow to freedom of expression
online'). European courts in other contexts have also recently issued press-restrictive rulings.
For example, a regional French court just required Google to find a way to effectively remove
pictures of an orgy involving Max Mosley, the former head of the racing organization FIA and
son of British fascist leader Sir Oswald Mosley. Alexandria Sage, Google Ordered to Remove
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without trans-national ownership as such, the online activities of
American news organizations-by generating foreseeable U.K.
audiences-could bring them within the ambit of British press
regulation and impose liability for media torts under British law.
The possibility of liability exposure-potentially in the millions
of dollars-for activities of a foreign news organization is likely to
have a significant impact on the editorial and newsgathering
mindset of that entity.93 U.S. organizations with British media
interests or those that direct their online activities to generating
British audiences might even feel compelled to participate
"voluntarily" in the British press self-regulatory system.9 4
Compliance by a company's British subsidiaries or interests could
well lead to the absorption of those norms elsewhere in the
organization-including in the company's American press
holdings-either as a result of voluntary adherence to the
regulator or the chilling effect of fear of liability, or both.9 5
Max Mosley Sex Party Images, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:17 PM), http://www.reuters.comart
icle/2013/11/06/france-google-idUSL5NOIR3SL20131106. Mosley initially won a suit in
England for breach of confidence and unauthorized disclosure of personal information against
the News of the World tabloid over its article revealing the orgy. Mosley v. News Group
Newspapers Limited, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [232].
93 The cost of membership is likely to have an impact on which American media
companies' British interests would choose to participate in a Leveson-type regulator. While
small Internet voices might find the cost too dear, the large media conglomerates are all
likely to participate in a Leveson-inspired press regulation scheme.
94 As recognized in the Leveson Report itself, online entities have already voluntarily
adopted a practice of complying with local, British law. See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. I, supra
note 1, at 165-79 (discussing application of British law to online news providers of various
sorts); id. at 171-72 (describing the Huffington Post's voluntary subscription to the PCC,
even under the pre-Leveson regime).
95 Of course, it would be possible to erect Chinese walls between the American and
European news operations in commonly owned entities. Such differences might even make
economic sense as reactions to differences in the demographics of the different entities'
audiences. But policing such walls increases transactions costs. A model of institutional
separation--of journalistic silos within an umbrella organization-is likely to be sorely
tested as journalistic efficiency in the modern age leads to collaboration, re-use, and re-
packaging of stories, and trans-border deployment of professional staff. If the work
investigated and reported in territory X is also going to be used in territory Y, which has
more stringent limits on journalistic activity, then even the originating journalists in
territory X may be influenced in their choices by the more restrictive norms and rules of
territory Y. See Ashley Messenger, What Would a 'Wight to be Forgotten"Mean for Media in
the United States?, 29 COMM. LAW. 1, 103 (2012) ("The EU rules may become a de facto
standard for what is permitted online."). While another possibility is that companies will
"geo-filter" leading to a Balkanized Internet (see id.), effective geo-filtering would likely be
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B. POSSIBLE DIFFUSION OF BRITISH NEWS STANDARDS TO THE U.S.
VIA PRESS PRACTICES
In addition to the chilling effects of feared British court
decisions against the press, the new news ecosystem suggests the
possibility of "soft harmonization" of reportorial and editorial
practices over time. The increasing mobility of journalists and
editors world-wide, the rise in cross-ownership or less formal
cooperative relationships between American and foreign media,
and the apparent flourishing of international media collaborations
could set the stage for the exportation of journalistic constraints
embedded in Leveson-inflected practice norms.
96
1. Personnel. The international arc of professional journalistic
careers today may lead to increasing trans-border norm influences.
In the twenty-first century, the "British invasion" to which
newspapers refer is the increasing employment of British
journalists by U.S. media.97 If this continues, the influx of foreign-
trained reporters will likely influence the operations of the
American press, although the precise nature of the impact is not
yet clear. To be sure, some British reporters working for American
press organizations are likely to see their U.S. employment as a
way to avoid the subtle censorship of Leveson-inspired press self-
regulation at home, and will happily shed the strictures of press
very difficult to accomplish as a practical matter given the breadth of coverage provided by
the online editions of newspapers and the variety and complexity of media tort laws.
96 This Article assumes, on the basis of the Leveson Report, that at least some of the
press standards ultimately likely to be adopted by the British press regulator will diverge
from the norms generally applicable to the U.S. press. Although the specific code provisions
have not yet been drafted, the drafters may be influenced by the Leveson Report's critiques
of the adequacy of the PCC's existing Editor's Code of Practice, its suggestions of the
desirability of press standards more sensitive to the privacy interests of subjects of press
attention, its apparent toleration of not insignificant second-guessing of editorial decisions,
and its assumption of the adequacy of a uniform set of standards for the press as a whole.
The Royal Charter's provisions firmly track the Leveson Report. The private alternatives
as well-IPSO and IMPRESS-appear largely to accept the Leveson Report's diagnosis of
the British press's cultural failings. See generally Prospectus, THE IMPRESS PROJECT,
http://impressproject.org/prospectus/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) (providing details of the
IMPRESS project, which "will regulate the press in compliance with Leveson's criteria");
IPSO: INDEPENDENT PRESS STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, http://ipso.co/uk/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2014) (providing general information about IPSO).
97 See, e.g., David Carr, British Invasion Reshuffles U.S. Media, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/24fbusiness/media/britain-as-a-breeding-ground-for-media-le
aders.html?pagewanted=all (recognizing a number of prominent British journalists employed
by U.S. news agencies).
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codes.98 Yet others-perhaps editors in particular-may well bring
with them journalistic norms limited by Leveson-inflected
assumptions, particularly over time as the new press self-
regulation regime unfolds, generating and standardizing practice
norms. Professional routines may exert subtle homogenizing
effects, even if not always consciously or over the full range of
journalistic contexts.
2. Collaboration. Even without massive trans-Atlantic
employment shifts, increased trans-border institutional
cooperation is likely to influence press practices. Economic and
political pressures now invite formerly turf-protective and
competitive news organizations to engage in experiments in
collaborative news production. News organizations may
reasonably see cooperation as a necessary political (and even
existential) strategy when they seek to reveal information that
powerful states wish to keep secret. 99
98 This might be especially true for digital-era journalists without mainstream institutional
affiliations, such as the advocacy journalists of the networked Fourth Estate. See YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM 236 (Yale Univ. Press 2006) (describing the historical and modern characterizations
of the press as the Fourth Estate). For example, it is hard to believe that Glenn Greenwald-
former columnist for The Guardian and one of the journalists to whom NSA contractor
Snowden revealed U.S. national security information-would hew in his reporting to press-
restrictive journalistic standards associated with a Leveson-type press model. See Bill Keller,
Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.comI
2013/10/28/opiniona-conversation-in-lieu-of-a-column.html?_r=O (colloquy between former
New York Times editor Bill Keller and advocacy journalist Glenn Greenwald on the question of
neutral reporting versus advocacy journalism).
99 That the national security information leaked by Wikileaks and Edward Snowden was
given to multiple news institutions itself tells the story. See US, UK Officials Worry Snowden
Still has 'Doomsday' Collection of Classified Material, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2013, 1:02 AM),
http://rt.com/usa/snowden-doomsday-classified-documents-294/ (noting that Snowden initially
gave classified documents to both The Guardian and the Washington Post and, reportedly, to
others worldwide). Some kinds of news stories require multiple coordinated releases to give
cover to the sources and the press itself against governmental pressure, censorship, and
retaliation. Today, governments wishing to stifle discussion and censor the press have at their
disposal not only extensive electronic sophistication and immense data-gathering capabilities
of their own, but also the quiet cooperation of private information intermediaries such as
broadband providers and telephone companies. Both leakers and news organizations
recognize that effective dissemination now requires a hydra-headed strategy. As press critic
and blogger Jay Rosen puts it: "the surveillance state is global, so the struggle to report on its
overreach has to move about the globe, as well." Jay Rosen, To Make Journalism Harder,
Slower, Less Secure, PRESSTHINK (Aug. 29, 2013), http://pressthink.org/. The Guardian's
Editor, Alan Rusbridger, has promised that although his paper's destruction of hard drives
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It is not unreasonable to expect, even without engaging in a
detailed empirical inquiry, that all of these ongoing trans-border
interactions might generate a tendency toward synchronization of
at least some journalistic norms. Once important stories are
associated with cooperative press alliances rather than
competitive news organizations, consensus-based working norms
are likely to emerge. International cooperation among news
organizations is increasingly seen as a way to avoid territorial
press censorship. 100  Yet collaboration can also, often subtly,
extend the reach of censorship.
C. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON U.S. DOMESTIC COURTS
Finally, regardless of their suitability for the British journalism
context, lessons from British press regulation could be imported by
U.S. courts seeking to recalibrate the current press/privacy
balance by measuring press behavior against media ethics norms.
While there are serious constitutional impediments to wholesale
incorporation of standards that would conflict with core First
Amendment principles, the groundwork has been laid for reduced
deference to the press as an institution in the United States.
Some American media scholars, focusing on the failures of the
commercial press, have joined the regulatory bandwagon, calling
for improved press practices, mandated press responsibility, and
even the possibility of press regulation. 10 1 These voices are raised
containing Snowden-related documents at the government's request may have satisfied the
British government,
[i]t felt like a peculiarly pointless piece of symbolism that understood
nothing about the digital age. We will continue to do patient, painstaking
reporting on the Snowden documents, we just won't do it in London. The
seizure of Miranda's laptop, phones, hard drives and camera will similarly
have no effect on Greenwald's work.
Alan Rusbridger, David Miranda, Schedule 7 and the Danger That All Reporters Now Face,
THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/da
vid-miranda-schedule 7-danger-reporters.
100 See, e.g., Joe McDonald, Google helps Chinese: Avoid Censorship, USA TODAY (June 1,
2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/technews/story/2012-06-01/google-china-censorship/55
326416/1 (discussing the ways in which Google tries to help Chinese Internet users circumvent
censored word searches).
101 See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
781, 781 (2009) (discussing whether the press and free market principles are capable of
regulating ethics in today's journalism marketplace); Richard J. Peltz, Fifteen Minutes of
Infamy: Privileged Reporting and the Problem of Perpetual Reputational Harm, 34 OHIO N.
930 [Vol. 48:907
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in an environment in which the media no longer enjoy the
significant public esteem in which the investigative press was held
after Watergate. 1 2 And while large numbers of people applaud
the press for its coverage of government surveillance
developments, many also fault both whistleblowers like WikiLeaks
and Snowden, and the professional press through which it
disseminated its information.
10 3
Regardless of old assumptions about press freedom, government
concerns about national security have recently been used to justify
press subpoenas and wide-ranging attempts to access
newsgathering records. 10 4
U. L. REV. 717, 720 (2008) (warning that media must "self-regulate" by placing more weight
on the rights of the subjects of their stories or else be regulated by law); Andrew Selbst,
Note, The Journalism Ratings Board. An Incentive-Based Approach to Cable News
Accountability, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 467, 469-72 (2011) (making a limited proposal
that cable news should be regulated by a sub-agency within the Federal Communications
Commission). For an earlier argument of this kind, see, e.g., Todd F. Simon, Libel as
Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 449, 452
(1985) (proposing that libel be treated as a malpractice action rather than a general tort).
See also Tricchinelli, supra note 88, at 15 (quoting the Dean of Berkeley Graduate School of
Journalism on the possible appropriateness of something akin to the Leveson Report in the
United States if new media diverges significantly from traditional media: "The question
now is whether in the digital age, marked by real-time news scrambling, the media are
moving toward a new hypercompetitive epoch, and a corresponding impatience with
patience and accuracy. If so, self-regulation [may become] a prospect to be addressed on our
side of the Atlantic as well."); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive
Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 182 (1999)
(describing public distaste for intrusive newsgathering in the late 1990s); cf. Cristina
Carmody Tilley, Rescuing the Dignitary Torts from the Constitution, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 65,
65-66 (2013) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment would provide a "foothold in the
Constitution" for dignitary torts so as to limit First Amendment interpretations that would
otherwise "force the abolition of these torts," in practice and possibly in theory).
102 See, e.g., DANIEL H. WEAVER ET AL., THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AT THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENNIUM 137 (2007) (reporting fading
glamour of Watergate).
103 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 31,
32-33 (2011) (discussing the controversy over WikiLeaks).
104 Scholars have noted increases in the numbers of press subpoenas. See, e.g., Sandra
Davidson, Leaks, Leakers, and Journalists: Adding Historical Context to the Age of
WikiLeaks, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 27, 71 (2011) (asserting that federal subpoenas
are more frequent than they were five years ago); RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or
Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 585, 667 (2009) (noting that even an "incrementally larger number of subpoenas"
allows for more opportunities to "unravel" a judicially-created privilege). The Associated
Press revealed in May 2013, for example, that the Justice Department had secretly collected
two months of telephone records for its reporters and editors. See Matt Smith & Joe Johns,
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Judicial regulation of press practices has also reflected
ambivalence towards journalistic enterprises. On the one hand,
the U.S. Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized the important
role played by the press in democracy and has been quite
deferential, at least in dicta, to editorial freedom.10 5 On the other
hand, both reporter's privilege cases from the 1970s and
contemporary rhetoric in the U.S. Supreme Court's cases reveal a
counter-trend skeptical of media exceptionalism. 106  At a
AP Blasts Feds for Phone Records Search, CNN (May 14, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/
05/13/us/justice-ap-phones/index.html.
105 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding a
newspaper right-of-reply statute unconstitutional under the First Amendment due to its
interference with the press' editorial freedom); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496-97 (1975) (holding that a state could not constitutionally impose sanctions on the
accurate publication of a rape victim's name obtained from public judicial records due to a
reluctance to invite "timidity and self-censorship" in the press); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that a newspaper that published lawfully obtained truthful
information about a matter of public significance revealed by government officials may only
be punished to further a "state interest of the highest order"). See generally Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter's Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515, 522
(2007) (describing the Supreme Court's recognition of "the important role the mainstream
media plays in our democracy").
106 For the Supreme Court's rejection of a constitutionally required reporter's privilege,
see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708-09 (1972) (holding that a reporter did not have a
special First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer a relevant and material question
asked during a grand jury investigation of a story she wrote). See also David A. Anderson,
Confidential Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 894 (2009) (describing the
Branzburg holding). Scholarly work on the limitations of a federal constitutional privilege
for reporter-source confidentiality is extensive. For a recent contribution, see RonNell
Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2013)
(arguing that the Court should analyze "confidential source cases based on the anonymous-
speech rights of issues, rather than on the information-flow or newsgathering rights of the
reporters").
For more recent rhetoric cutting against exceptional status for media corporations, see,
e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (quoting Justice
Scalia for the proposition that there is not a constitutional privilege for the institutional
press beyond that of other speakers). Admittedly, the Court's assertion was "almost
offhanded" and has been subject to scathing critique. See Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle
Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 654-55 (2011)
(criticizing the Citizens United opinion for its lack of "substantive discussion of the reasons
for the conclusion"); see also C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of The Press
Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955, 956, 959 (2007) (proposing a complex
and nuanced reading of the press's juridical status in American law, premised on the belief
that case law treats the press differently from individual speakers).
The Court has also been much more deferential to state regulation in the context of
broadcasting. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the
FCC's fairness doctrine against First Amendment attack).
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minimum, these "tensions embedded in existing law can be a
source of legal instability."
10 7
Some lower courts have displayed increased skepticism
regarding the press and its practices. 08 Protection of confidential
news sources is a useful context in which to see the tensions in
judicial and legislative approaches to press protection. 10 9 The
107 Baker, supra note 106, at 1024.
108 See Amy Gajda, The Justices and News Judgment: The Supreme Court as News Editor,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1759, 1784-90 (discussing several cases in which the courts have been
willing to punish journalists for covering events that are arguably in the public interest);
Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the
Press, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1041-43 (2009) (explaining that the position favoring journalist
in legal contests over newsworthiness is now under pressure); Amy Gajda, The Value of
Detective Stories, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 385, 381-97 (2011) (discussing cases in
which courts have held publications potentially liable for reporting routine detective
stories); Clay Calvert, Every Picture Tells A Story, Don't It? Wrestling with the Complex
Relationship Among Photographs, Words and Newsworthiness in Journalistic Storytelling,
33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349, 356 (2010) (arguing that courts are growing less deferential to
the press in privacy cases); Eric B. Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a
Laboratory for First Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287,
294-309 (2011) (providing both broad and narrow readings of the Court's newsgathering
decision in Bartnicki); Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in
the United States Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 247, 252-53 (2007) (noting that
the press has been more successful at lobbying courts in its self-interest outside the
newsgathering context); Lidsky, supra note 101, at 184-85, 239 (noting that the media
receive far less constitutional protection with respect to newsgathering than publishing,
and arguing that although the balance between privacy and press freedoms with respect to
intrusive newsgathering methods should be tipped in favor of privacy, a newsgatherer's
privilege should be adopted to protect media intrusions that serve a significant public
interest); Erik Ugland, Demarcating the Right to Gather News: A Sequential Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 113, 116-36 (2008) (reporting on
mixed results in press cases); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1025, 1042-46 (2011) (discussing reduced legal protection for newsgathering). For a
positive view of these developments, see Karcher, supra note 101, at 823-34 ("In order for
the press to regain credibility, it must be acknowledged by the courts that the press has lost
credibility."). Cf. Randall Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension Between
Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J. 895, 896-97
(1998) (rejecting special press immunity for newsgathering); Brian C. Murchison et al.,
Sullivan's Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7
(1994) (describing how the actual malice standard under New York Times v. Sullivan in
libel cases "invites judges to create norms of acceptable journalistic conduct for all three
stages of news gathering, namely, research, writing, and editing).
109 While some courts have applied state reporter shield laws liberally, others in recent
high-profile cases have rejected journalists' attempts to protect source confidentiality. The
move to establish a federal reporter shield law designed to protect journalists from
compelled disclosure of their sources failed in 2011, partly because of the controversy
prompted by the spectacular release of U.S. government documents by WikiLeaks. See, e.g.,
Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the
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digital press and media consolidation have also generated new
challenges to traditional journalistic practices, generating
occasions for judicial interference with news judgments.110
Reference to Leveson-inspired press standards might move U.S.
courts further towards rejecting press exceptionalism.
Investigative journalism in the United States has often
required the use of surreptitious methods: undercover
newsgathering techniques, dissimulation, deceit, entrapment, and
sometimes, doubtless, bribes of public officials and other
sources.111 Whether here or in Britain, investigative journalism is
"not a dinner party."112 Questionable investigative techniques are
sometimes necessary in the public interest, even if they would
normally violate journalistic ethics norms. 113 Were U.S. courts to
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 315-30 (2011) (summarizing the
release of U.S. government documents by WikiLeaks). Although the current version-the
Free Flow of Information Act, H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http:/fbeta.congre
ss.govfbill13th/house-bill1962-may ultimately be enacted, it has notable limitations. See
Steven Nelson, Holes in Media Shield Law Worry Opponents, and Even Some Supporters,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 18, 2013 (describing issues with the Free Flow of
Information Act). See generally Sandra Davidson & David Herrera, Needed.- More Than a
Paper Shield, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1277 (2012) (describing state shield laws and
proposing model law).
110 For an overview of the impact of social media on the press, see generally Lili Levi,
Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1547-55 (2012).
M See generally KROEGER, supra note 87 (contending that much of valuable journalism
has been a product of undercover investigations of those employing various forms of
deception); Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2012)
(tracing the necessary development of privacy doctrines); Lidsky, supra note 101, at 178
("Prying, spying, and lying by the media are not new techniques."); DECEPTION FOR
JOURNALISM'S SAKE: A DATABASE, NYU, http://dlib.nyu.edu/undercover/ (last visited Mar.
15, 2014) (New York University-sponsored database of undercover and surreptitious
reporting and associated stories).
112 David Leigh, Scandal on Tap, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2006), http://www.theguardian.
com/mediaI2006/dec/O4lmondaymediasection ("Investigative journalism is not a dinner
party, particularly in a secretive country like ours where the privacy cards are stacked in
favour of the rich and powerful.").
113 Arguably, when the press cannot engage in its watchdog function without bending
process rules, society may have to accept the cost of non-compliance, error, and excess in
exchange for the clear social benefits of the journalistic output. For a history of American
investigative reporters' use of deception and other surreptitious techniques, see generally
KROEGER, supra note 87. See also Ugland, supra note 108, at 176-77 & n.368 (providing
examples of deceptive techniques used in investigative journalism); cf. Leigh, supra note
112 (explaining the need to use surreptitious newsgathering practices in the public interest
in England as well); BONNIE J. BROWNLEE & RANDAL A. BEAM, U.S. Journalists in the
Tumultuous Early Years of the 21st Century, in THE GLOBAL JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST
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apply the Leveson lens to surreptitious behavior, however, it is at
best unclear whether the mainstream U.S. press's behavior would
pass muster.114 And perhaps less admirably than traditional
investigative journalism, U.S. electronic media have aired
sensational news-as-entertainment programming. 1 5  Such
CENTURY, supra note 87, at 348, 358 (suggesting shifts in American journalists' willingness
to use various types of surreptitious newsgathering techniques).
To the extent that such press behavior is not currently the focus of public discussion, it
may be because the economic hardships faced by the U.S. press have led to a reduction in
commitment to expensive accountability journalism. See, e.g., STEVEN WALDMAN, FED.
COMMC'NS COMM'N, THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA
LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 52-53 (2011), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-307406Al.pdf (discussing the decline of investigative journalism
in the local news industry); BROWNLEE & BEAM, supra, at 361.
114 Some might think that even if British press regulation could threaten the British tabloid
press (whose sensational and gossipy coverage has little public value), it would be unlikely to
reach the journalism of the mainstream, respectable cohort of the American press. After all,
unlike Britain, the United States does not have a robust tabloid press these days. Other than
the National Enquirer, U.S. print journalism purports boringly to hew to standards of
objectivity and public interest. And apart from the paparazzi stalking Hollywood celebrities
for gossip magazines, mainstream American journalists ordinarily do not engage in
"checkbook journalism" or routinely practice the "dark arts" in their newsgathering as
described by the Leveson Report. The ethics codes of the mainstream press generally look
askance at highly intrusive newsgathering, and a recent empirical study of journalists' views
indicates that many American reporters at least articulate that same attitude. BROWNLEE &
BEAM, supra note 113, at 358. The U.S. press has at least a recent history of openness about
its own misbehavior. For example, the recent "mini-scandal" involving the revelation that
journalists working for the financial news company Bloomberg had accessed client data in the
pursuit of news stories was addressed with such transparency, expert outside review, and
responsive management changes to data access policies that the Columbia Journalism Review
ran a story titled: Bloomberg as the Anti-News Corp.: Its Transparent Handling of Snooping
Allegations Starkly Contrasts With News Corp. Cover-Ups. Dean Starkman, Bloomberg as the
Anti-News Corp., COLUM. J. REV. (Aug. 21, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.cjr.org/the-audit/bloom
berg-as-the-anti-newscorp.php?page=all&print=true; see also Dan Barry et al.,
CORRECTING THE RECORD; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/correcting-the-record-times-
reporter-who-resigned-leaves-long-trail-of-deception.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (revealing
journalistic fraud by New York Times reporter Jayson Blair); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 102,
at 130 (describing the New York Times's "extraordinary 14,000-word explanation of Blair's
misdeeds').
Nevertheless, the reality is far more complicated. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 101, at
175-83, 217-19. In the United States, for example, cable television news programs-which
increasingly resemble the entertainment talk show format, see STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA
2013, PEW RESEARCH CENTER PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, available at http://
stateofthemedia.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2014) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CENTER]--offers
a type of sensationalist, opinionated, passionately delivered programming reminiscent of the
British tabloids. E.g., id. at 217 (detailing 20/20's expos6 of nursing home abuses in Texas).
115 Popular examples include broadcasts involving police ride-alongs, predator-outing
shows such as To Catch a Predator, and the "perp walk" ubiquitous on local television news.
936 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:907
programming would be even more problematic in a Leveson-type
regime."16 Particularly if "a new American privacy is already on
the rise"-one in which American courts already engage in a kind
of balancing between free expression and privacy that is more
common in Europe'17-these courts might naturally look to press
reform developments in Britain as part of their analyses." 8
At least sometimes, the larger public interest will be disserved.
Examples of self-censorship are evident even in "old" media. 1 9
See Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence B. Alexander, Testing the Boundaries of the First
Amendment Press Clause: A Proposal for Protecting the Media from Newsgathering Torts, 32
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1093, 1094 (2009) (describing To Catch a Predator); see generally
Amy Adler, To Catch a Predator, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 130 (2012) (providing a
psychoanalytic reading of the program).
116 For example, while police ride-alongs and perp walks are not considered inappropriate
invasions of privacy or inconsistent with norms of judicial process in criminal cases in the
United States, Leveson was clear in stating that suspects' or arrestees' identities should be
deemed confidential until conviction. See Alex Balin, Leveson: Police and the Media, the
Proposals, INFORRM'S BLOG (Mar. 12, 2012), http://inforrm.wordpress.com2012/12/03leves
on-police-and-the-media-the-proposals-alex-bailin-qc/ (stating that while Leveson's
guidelines regarding the confidentiality of suspects is welcome, the Report should have gone
further and prohibited police ride-alongs for the press).
117 See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 365, 365,
372 (2013) (suggesting that "American privacy norms already are moving in the direction of
Europe's" despite free speech law).
118 Developments such as California's adoption of anti-paparazzi legislation could be seen to
support this suggestion. See Patrick McGreevy, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Law Protecting
Children of Public Figure, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/
local/la-me-pc-gov-brown-signs-law-protecting-children-of-public-figures-20130924. For a
historical account of privacy in U.S. press jurisprudence, see generally Barbas, supra note 111.
See also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 905 (2013)
(noting fundamental and irreconcilable differences between the concepts of privacy in the
United States and Europe). Yet because of the reality of trans-national interactions,
Krotoszynski suggests "disaggregating the concept of privacy into more discrete and easily
definable packets or sticks of rights" in order to "point the way to a shared solution." Id. at
906. While this is an eminently sensible suggestion, the devil is, as always, in the details.
American courts seeking to follow Krotoszynski's lead in the press context might well look to
the British approach under Leveson as a guide.
119 Recent examples of self-censorship by major newspapers in response to White House
requests on national security grounds are described in Glenn Greenwald, US Media Yet
Again Conceals Newsworthy Government Secrets, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2013), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/07/saudi-arabia-drones-media-concealment.
Further examples of self-censorship by newspapers have been collected in filings in
challenges to NSA surveillance. See, e.g., Claire Gordon, Survey: 1 in 6 Writers Have Self-
Censored Because of NSA Surveillance, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Nov. 21, 2013), http://americ
aaljazeera.com/watchlshows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/11/21/survey- 1-in-6
-writershaveselfcensoredbecauseofnsasurveillance.html. Earlier, the United States had its
own version of Hackgate: the Cincinnati Enquirer's expos6 of human rights violations and
widespread abuses by Chiquita, based in part on material obtained by illegally tapping the
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The complex realities of "new" journalism today pose even greater
challenges to the notion of newsworthiness as established by
reference to the best judgments of professional editors. It may be
that newsgathering in the future will become, at least sometimes,
more lawless and lacking in editorial filter, undertaken by those
unaffiliated with or untrained by professional news
organizations. 
120
Ultimately, if the American courts tip the balance against the
press-particularly in connection with the surreptitious
newsgathering often necessary for public interest investigative
reporting-then a fundamentally important part of the democratic
checks-and-balances on which we rely could be profoundly
diminished.
121
company's voice-mail system. Alicia C. Shepard, Bitter Fruit, AM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept.
1998), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=543. Despite a year of painstaking investigative
journalism and the editors' continuing belief in the substantive truth of the stories, the
paper renounced them, apologized in print, and paid Chiquita over ten million dollars. Id.
120 Recent events have revealed a dark side to relying on new journalistic techniques. In
April 2013, a bloody terrorist bombing of the Boston Marathon was reported not simply via
the usual journalistic techniques, but also by mainstream media organizations relying
extensively on Twitter and crowdsourcing. Simon Rogers, The Boston Bombing: How
Journalists Used Twitter to Tell the Story, TWITTER (July 10, 2013), https:/Iblog.twitter.com
2013/the-boston-bombing-how-journalists-used-twitter-to-tell-the-story; Seth Mnookin &
Hong Qu, Organize the Noise: Tweeting Live from the Boston Manhunt: A Reporter and a
Programmer on What Social Media Coverage of the Boston Bombings Means for Journalism,
NEIMAN REPORTS (Spring 2013), available at http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/articl
e/102885/Organize-the-Noise-Tweeting-Live-from-the-Boston-Manhunt.aspx. In the course
of that reporting, mainstream news organizations latched on to the breathless (and often
incorrect) identification of suspects by the Reddit hive community. See Jordan Zakarin,
Boston Bombing: How Reddit, Twitter and the Internet Helped and Hurt the Manhunt,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 19, 2013, 8:06 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/
boston-bombing-how-reddit-twitter-442946 ("While news outlets debate internally before
reporting, Reddit's process is transparent, leading to a difficult relationship with the
outside world grasping for any information."). As a result of uncritical reliance on the
undisciplined activities of well-intentioned citizens, or because false information can be
disguised by tweeter-police-media "credibility-building feedback loop[s]," the advantages of
citizen journalism were undercut by the harm to innocents. Id. These sorts of
developments are likely to lead to less press-protective attitudes of courts in media tort
cases.
121 If U.S. courts did not refer to the British press regime in the past (although pre-
Leveson British law was already more stringent than U.S. law and the British newspaper
industry was already subject to PCC regulation), what does the Leveson-influenced press
reform add that could induce a U.S. court to refer to British norms?
The post-Leveson era is likely to offer a different level of analogy to an interested
American court. According to the Leveson Report, the PCC had been both ineffective and
universally perceived as such, profoundly reducing the Commission's credibility and
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IV. WHY U.S. FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM IS
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT Now
It is particularly important today to resist press-restrictive
"reform" attempts, reaffirm American First Amendment
exceptionalism, and push for a press-protective attitude in U.S.
law. In the age of pervasive surveillance, the national security
state, and government censorship world-wide, 122 there needs to be
a place where the global press, acting in the public interest, has a
chance to circumvent authoritarian reporting limits and perform
its democratic functions. Moreover, a British regulatory system
that defines and controls press excesses that Britain deems
responsive to perceived British cultural norms would make it
much easier for authoritarian or corrupt regimes to resist
challenges to their press restrictions on grounds of their own
cultural norms.
legitimacy. LEVESON REPORT, Executive Summary, supra note 4, at 12. A new body, armed
with the kinds of powers recommended in the Leveson Report and structured to promote
independence, would offer a very different alternative. See id. at 32-46 (outlining
recommendations for an independent self-regulatory regime). As for increased occasions for
relevance of British standards, upsurges in collaborative newsgathering and reporting by
British and American journalists could make it difficult for courts to separate out the
different kinds of journalistic norms to apply to different participants. Moreover, the
Leveson Report's suggested reforms go beyond existing British norms. Because of the
regulator's broad area of authority, its independence, and the suggested transparency and
public participation of its processes, id., it is possible that its definition of the public interest
and its journalism code could be deemed to have broad, if not universal, legitimacy and
application. Even if an American court were to refer to these British developments as a
matter of contrast, the comparative baselines would have shifted. Because British press
reform would now permit more regulatory second-guessing of newsgathering and reporting
practices than previously, American courts could ratchet up press expectations as well, even
if not to the same extent as under the British regime. Finally, British law regarding
privacy is non-statutory and complex. See LEVESON REPORT, Vol. IV, supra note 40, at 1861
(criticizing misfit of claims of intrusion into breach of confidence tort). Although the British
precedent does seem to distinguish between public interest journalism and titillating
coverage of celebrities in which the public might be interested, cases vary in the leeway
they give journalists. The Leveson Report's apparent approval of the least press-protective
privacy precedent could unduly influence American courts looking for comparative analyses.
122 See generally FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 21 (providing "a comprehensive study of
internet freedom in 47 countries around the globe" and finding "many authoritarian states
have taken various measures to filter, monitor, or otherwise obstruct free speech online").
2014] JOURNALISM STANDARDS AND "THE DARK ARTS" 939
A. THE NEED TO REFOCUS ON STATE POWER
Much progressive First Amendment scholarship has criticized
traditional, negative-rights interpretations of the First
Amendment as overly focused on the government as a threat to
speech and insufficiently sensitive to the censorious power of
private entities. 123 Yet having a powerful press to stand up to
government 124 is particularly important today when governments
use the threat of terror and the need for national security to justify
both secret surveillance and a zero-tolerance approach to
journalistic revelation of their activities. In Britain, for example,
as lawmakers contemplate press reform in response to the Leveson
Report's recommendations, the government is engaging in various
press-intimidating practices. 125  British journalists talk of an
123 There is vast literature on this motif, particularly in the context of broadcast
regulation. For important examples, see generally J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the
Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press:
A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech
and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
124 This is not to say that government is the only threat or repository of power, or that the
press need not be a watchdog over private power as well. Many have argued that state
involvement can beneficially shore up the press against the rising power of private,
corporate entities. For such an argument in the context of the Leveson Inquiry, see Jacob
Rowbottom, Leveson, Press Freedom and the Watchdogs, 21 RENEWAL, no. 1, at 57, available
at http://renewal.org/uklfiles/Rowbottomjfinal.pdf. While it would be unrealistic to deny the
influence of private power, however, its existence should not blind us to the rise and
effectiveness of government power, or to the degree to which government can partner with
and use private resources in accomplishing its objectives.
125 The British government has been actively trying to discourage reporting on governmental
surveillance. Recently, The Guardian's editor, Alan Rusbridger, was required to testify before
a parliamentary committee in connection with his newspaper's decision to print stories based
on Edward Snowden's leaked national security documents. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola,
Guardian Editor Defends Publication of Snowden Files, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/guardian-editor-defends-publication-of-snowden-files/
2013/12/03/8204608e-5c49-11e3-8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html. The partner of Glenn
Greenwald, former columnist for The Guardian, was detained and had his electronics
confiscated at the airport last year. Guardian Staff, Glenn Greenwald's Partner Detained at
Heathrow Airport for Nine Hours, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2013), http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/aug/18/glenn-greenwald-guardian-partner-detained-heathrow. The
Guardian's chief lawyer recently cited that detention as "show[ing] why the state must not be
allowed to regulate the press." Gavriel Hollander, Leveson Has Been 'Disastrous' Says
Guardian Legal Chief, PRESSGAZETTE (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/leveson-
has-been-disastrous-says-guardian-legal-chief. The British government has also issued "D
notices" or Defence Advisory Notices, to the press prohibiting publication of information that
could jeopardize national security. See, e.g., Josh Halliday, MoD Serves News Outlets with D
Notice Over Surveillance Leaks, THE GUARDiAN (June 17, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.theguar
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existential crisis for the kind of accountability journalism that
gives the press its democratic pedigree. 12 6  Editors like The
Guardian's Rusbridger have been explicit in casting the United
States as a journalistic haven for some of the watchdog journalism
they cannot freely practice at home. 127  The risk of official
oppression, limits on informational access, and prohibitions on
dissent and government critique are greater yet in truly
authoritarian regimes. 128  American's First Amendment
exceptionalism leads to positive externalities for the public
interest not only for American audiences, but worldwide.
B. ALREADY-BELEAGUERED: THREATS TO U.S. PRESS FREEDOM
The global benefit that U.S. press freedom can provide is
threatened both by domestic factors and by the possible influence
of less press-protective, non-U.S. norms. The U.S. commercial
press is itself under domestic burdens on every front. American
press organizations face government pressure, including scrutiny
dian.com/world/2013/jun/17/defence-d-bbc-media-censor-surveillance-security (reporting on the
issuance of a confidential D notice to the BBC and other media groups by Defense officials).
Further, the new head of M15 implicitly accused The Guardian of having aided terrorism in
publishing secret material leaked by Snowden. Ian Burrell, The Real Reason It's Open Season
on 'The Guardian,' INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comme
nt/the-real-reason-its-open-season-on-the-guardian-8875021.html.
126 See generally Tim Luckhurst, Missing the Target and Spurning the Prize, in THE
PHONE-HACKING SCANDAL-JOURNALISM ON TRIAL 176, 176-88 (Richard Lance Keeble &
John Mair eds., 2012) (arguing that the main question facing British policymakers is how to
finance an ethical future); Rusbridger, supra note 99 (noting that the state's "formidable
apparatus of surveillance" creates an "absolute threat to journalism" and predicting that "it
may not be long before it will be impossible for journalists to have confidential sources").
127 See Rusbridger, supra note 99 (noting that America "at least has press freedom
enshrined in a written constitution").
128 China, for example, has been notably restrictive in connection with foreign press
organizations and journalists recently. See, e.g., David Carr, Where Freedom of the Press Is
Muffled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2013), http://nytimes.com2013/12/09Ibusiness/media/where-
freedom-of-the-press-is-muffied.html; Evan Osnos, The Meaning of China's Crackdown on the
Foreign Press, NEW YORKER (Dec. 6, 2013), http://newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/
12/the-meaning-of-chinas-foreign-press-crackdown.html (reporting on Chinese government
threats to expel multiple correspondents). Under these sorts of circumstances, the problem is
not just that Chinese audiences are deprived of access to the information their government
does not want them to have, but also that U.S. journalists cannot enter the country to report.
At least sometimes, U.S. news organizations comply with Chinese censorship and refuse to
run stories for any audience at all. See, e.g., Edward Wong, Bloomberg News Is Said to Curb
Articles That Might Anger China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com2013/1I/
09/world/asia/bloomberg-news-is-said-to-curb-articl es-that-might-anger-china.html.
940
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for reporting on national security matters.129  Economic and
cultural pressures as well turn watchdogs into lapdogs in the
commercial media sector.130  Financial losses have led to
newspaper closures, decimation of the regional press, and
significant thinning of an already overworked journalistic staff.
13 1
129 See Adam Liptak, Court Rulings Blur the Line Between a Spy and a Leaker, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/us/politics/first-amendments-role-comes-in
to-question-as-leakers-are-prosecuted.html?emc=etal ('The federal government is prosecuting
leakers at a brisk clip and on novel theories. It is collecting information from and about
journalists, calling one a criminal and threatening another with jail."). Journalists' pre-
publication materials are being secretly gathered. Federal agents raided the Associated
Press's offices for documents, including home and cell phone records of reporters and editors,
and did so without notice or an opportunity for judicial review. See David Carr, For
Journalists, More Firepower to Protect Sources and Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/business/media/for-journalists-more-firepower-to-protect-sourc
es-and-secrets.html?ref-media&.r=2&. On the threat of the government legally pursuing the
press-and particularly smaller outlets-for reporting on the basis of leaks, see, e.g., Christina
E. Wells, Contextualizing Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks, Balancing, and the First Amendment,
97 IOWA L. REV. BuLL. 51, 61-62 (2012). See also Davidson, supra note 104, at 66 n.142 (citing
prior literature on the subject). Whistleblowers to the press are confronting prosecution and
jail time. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Former F.B.I. Agent to Plead Guilty in Press Leak, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/us/fbi-ex-agent-pleads-guilty-in-le
ak-to-ap.html (reporting on a former F.B.I. agent pleading guilty to leaking classified
documents and spending forty-three months in prison); Glenn Greenwald, The DOJ's Creeping
War on Whistleblowers, SALON (Feb. 25, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://www.salon.com2011/O2/25/wh
istleblowers_4 (noting that the Obama administration has indicated and prosecuted multiple
people who leaked information during the Bush Administration, revealing "various degrees of
corruption, ineptitude, and illegality'); Davidson, supra note 104, at 79 (stating that judges
can "order a subpoenaed journalist to disclose the source of (a] leak or go to jail"). Further,
private speech intermediaries have partnered with the government to increase the costs and
difficulties of newsgathering and dissemination. See generally Benkler, supra note 109
(regarding WikiLeaks).
130 See, e.g., Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 343, 347 (2012) and sources cited therein (summarizing scholarship on the changing
roles of the press); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press
and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 248-49 (2008) (describing the press
throughout history as occasionally serving the role of "lapdog of the executive branch").
The economic interests of large, publicly held, multi-national conglomerates do not
necessarily support the role of standing as bulwarks of press freedom. Because they are
effectively required by fiduciary duty to their shareholders to engage in cost-benefit
analyses of their activities, these entities have significant incentives to avoid or skimp on
expensive accountability journalism. See BROWNLEE & BEAM, supra note 113, at 361 ('The
challenging economic environment for U.S. news organizations raises questions about
whether they will be able to afford the costly investigative work that they have produced in
the past."). Corporate owners are aware that self-censorship in their journalistic divisions
can, in many circumstances, benefit their non-press interests.
131 See generally PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114. See also Luckhurst, supra note
126, at 176-88 (arguing that the "financial crisis facing journalism is paramount").
Consolidation of news operations means that there are fewer trained investigative journalists
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The American public is reputed to have little trust in the
press,132 and is noticing the effects on content due to a decade of
newsroom cutbacks. 133 At least in part because of the failures of
the American commercial press, American voices, like their
counterparts in Britain, have begun to call for enhanced
journalism standards to improve press accountability.
1 34
Because the economic incentives of both the government and
the commercial press tilt against an aggressive watchdog press,
and because it is desirable to maintain the United States as a safe
haven for important journalism impracticable elsewhere in the
world, shoring up First Amendment press exceptionalism should
be a front-burner value. The institutional press is still the top
option as a counterweight to government secrecy today. In
collaboration with its new digital partners, even the commercial
institutional press sector-whatever its limitations in funding,
training, corporate co-optation, and susceptibility to governmental
authority--can help serve democratic goals.
The potential influence of Leveson-inspired norms and laws
would enhance the already extensive threats to U.S. press freedom
independent of foreign norms. The possibility of liability abroad
and soft harmonization in press-restrictive directions domestically
is likely to exacerbate the chill already affecting the U.S. press, or
at least serve as an excuse for commercial press entities to avoid
the inevitable controversy with global investigative journalism.
Rather than serving as the global journalistic safety net, the U.S.
press sector could begin to operate as if it too were subject to global
press regulation.
in the field. There is a marked reduction in journalists' self-perception of professional
autonomy in U.S. news organizations. BROWNLEE & BEAM, supra note 113, at 355.
132 Elizabeth Mendes, In U.S., Trust in Media Recovers Slightly from an All-Time Low,
GALLUP POLITICS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164459/trust-media-recovers-
slightly-time-low.aspx.
133 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114, Overview, at 1 ("Nearly one-third of the
respondents (31%) have deserted a news outlet because it no longer provides the news and
information they had grown accustomed to."). On television, news and entertainment are
converging extensively. The high quality news coverage that the three-network television
oligopoly had provided as a matter of reputation and noblesse oblige in pre-cable days has
been swept away in the current environment of tireless competition. Furthermore, in a
notable development, newsmakers increasingly end-run the press and address the audience
directly via digital media. Id.
134 For sources advocating more press regulation, see sources cited supra note 101.
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C. A FREE AND IRRESPONSIBLE PRESS?
135
Attempts to perfect press practices and ethics from the outside,
via government-approved bureaucracies, should be resisted even
when supra-normal numbers of ethical failures might be expected.
The variety of participants in the news reporting enterprise, not to
mention technological changes, will likely increase the likelihood,
extent, degree, and permanence of error and harm, at least for
some time.136  Both untrained "citizen journalists" and the
overworked reporters of the traditional press are likely to cut
journalistic corners.13 7 Irresponsible and false journalism is likely
to increase not only in sensationalist tabloid revelations of sexual
misbehavior by public figures, but also in what would classically
be called watchdog or accountability journalism in the public
interest.
This is not a comfortable prediction. It might be reassuring to
think that the institutional press can help serve to constrain or
counteract the most irresponsible and harmful aspects of the non-
institutional participants in the news space. 138 That will certainly
often be the case, but not always. 139 Not only will the combination
135 Referencing Yochai Benkler's allusion to the Hutchins Commission's important report.
COMM'N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1947). See Benkler,
supra note 109, at 311.
136 See Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth
Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 75-83 (2011) (discussing accountability in social media
reporting); Levi, supra note 110, at 1556 (addressing impact of social media on reporting
practices of mainstream news organizations).
137 The twenty-four-hour news cycle, competitive pressure from a multiplicity of news
platforms and outlets, and increasing financial hardship all put pressure on the traditional
press model. For example, with newsroom cutbacks of 30% since 2000, few news outlets will
likely be able to enforce ideal fact- and source-checking for all or most of their stories. PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 114, Overview, at 1. Gaffes like those attending the coverage
of the Boston Marathon bombing, see Mnookin & Qu, supra note 120, may evidence corner-
cutting by traditional media. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 137, at 76-77, 77 n.467; Bill
Chappell, After Internal Review on Benghazi Report, CBS Puts Logan on Leave, NPR (Nov. 26,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/11/26/247372332/after-internal-review-on-be
nghazi-report-cbs-puts-logan-on-leave (discussing the flawed CBS story, based on a lying
source, on the 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya).
138 This is not to deny the contested character of objectivity-based claims in support of the
traditional press. See generally Keller, supra note 98.
139 For example, professional journalists and editors were able to review and redact the
huge cache of documents leaked to them by WikiLeaks, thereby seeking to reduce the
likelihood of harm from their disclosure. Fresh Air: NYT Reporter Defends Publishing
WikiLeaks Cables, NPR (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/programs/fresh-air/2010/12/08/1
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of the twenty-four-hour news day and reliance on untrained
tweeters likely lead to more factual error, but also as traditional
journalists increasingly focus on explanation, contextualization,
selection, and curation, their traditional ethical verities will likely
face new and unexpected sorts of challenges.
Yet First Amendment exceptionalism should not be scuttled
because the multiplicity and economic uncertainty of what
constitutes the press's function today can increase some risks of
error. Even if an unregulated networked Fourth Estate poses
perils, it is reasonable to worry that press self-regulatory regimes
such as the Leveson Report might open the door to global
regulation instantiating repressive press norms. This is a far
worse result, especially at times when the government's hidden
and expansive exercises of power most require the revelations of
the investigative press. Regulation, even the "soft," indirect
variety, is a particularly dangerous response to predictions of
irresponsibility and harm.
Surely, imposing costs and assessing damages will not help; the
U.S. print press already faces profound economic challenges.
Instead, participants in the new news space must attempt to
analyze their own practices and generate evolving norms-not as
tools to be used by courts or regulators to deter hard-hitting
journalism (for which an already-beleaguered commercial press
already has too little appetite), but as outgrowths of self-criticism
and improvement. 140 Criticism of the Leveson model does not
31905288/ ("[The New York Times] went through [the WikiLeak cables] so carefully to try to
redact material that we thought could be damaging to individuals or undercut ongoing
operations. And we even took the very unusual step of showing the 100 cables or so that we
were writing from to the U.S. government and asking them if they had additional
redactions to suggest."). Of course, some argue that even professionally trained journalists
do not have the ability to make fully-informed risk assessments in these sorts of
circumstances. And, in any event, the electronic availability of the leaked documents poses
dangers of unfiltered public disclosure of the raw data either intentionally by sources
unhappy with the press's processes, or unintentionally by error (as occurred with
WikiLeaks itself). See Peter M. Shane, Introduction-"The Future of Online Journalism:
News, Community, and Democracy in the Digital Age," 8 I/S 469, 469-70 (2013) (describing
the dangers of online news); Bambauer, supra note 103, at 34-42 (distinguishing the
WikiLeaks and Pentagon Papers contexts).
140 There are already signs of increasing self-reflection. From the New York Times's Public
Editor to the media columns in various newspapers, even the commercial news media are
paying attention to how well journalists and news organizations of all kinds do their jobs. See
Tanni Haas, Mainstream News Media Self.Criticism: A Proposal for Future Research,
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mean rejection of evolutionary press self-regulation. The press of
the future should evolve its behavioral norms by reference to a
combination of better enforcement of existing law and industry
self-criticism.' 4 ' The benefits of improved diversity in who
CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMUNICATION, Vol. 23, No. 4, Oct. 2006, at 350, 354 (noting the
changes and calling for further research). The role of public and non-profit media is very
important in this connection. From high quality public television exposbs to the investigative
work of entities like ProPublica and the fact-checking processed by groups like factcheck.org,
the public sector leaves room for the kind of journalism which the commercial sector's
economic concerns undermine. For excellent accounts of the possibilities of public media, see
Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media Networks,
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2010) and Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Digital Public
Service Media Networks to Advance Broadband and Enrich Connected Communities, 9 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 82 (2011). See also LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST,
AND WIDE-OPEN 4-8 (2010) (arguing strongly in favor of public media support). Another
example may be The Guardian's recent appeal to newspaper editors worldwide to address the
appropriateness of the paper's publication of articles based on the Snowden leaks. See
generally Editors on the NSA files: 'What the Guardian is Doing is Important for Democracy,'
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/guardian-demo
cracy-editors. Journalism practice textbooks as well are focusing on the new challenges of the
networked news landscape. See, e.g., MEGAN KNIGHT & CLARE COOK, SOCIAL MEDIA FOR
JOURNALISTS PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE (Mila Steele ed., 2013). In the new media environment,
journalistic self-criticism is also likely to be supplemented by real-time crowd response to
stories. See id. at 140 (describing the "regulatory capacity" of social media).
It should also be remembered that The Guardian and the New York Times did reveal the
British phone-hacking scandal. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr., Jo Becker & Graham Bowley,
Tabloid Hack Attack on Royals and Beyond, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
comI2010/09/05/magazine/05hacking-t.html?ref-newsoftheworld&_r=O (chronicling the News
of the Worlds phone-hacking scandal). Reputable newspapers have been using Edward
Snowden's leaked NSA materials to reveal the contours of state surveillance today. See, e.g.,
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order (reporting that a secret court order requires Verizon to give the NSA
information on all telephone calls made in the United States or between the United States and
another country). Although late, the American newspapers and television stations that
blindly followed the suspect identifications on Twitter during the Boston Marathon bombing
coverage ultimately did recognize and disclose their errors. See, e.g., Jack Mirkinson, CNN,
Fox News, AP Forced to Walk Back Reports of Boston Bombing Arrests, HUFF. POST (Apr. 17,
2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.huffngtonpost.com/2013/04/17/cnn-boston-arrests-media-nbcn_3
102680.html (reporting that CNN, Fox News, and the Associated Press initially incorrectly
reported that the police arrested a suspect in connection with the Boston Marathon bombing
and later retracted the statements). The hundreds of millions of pounds spent by News Corp.
on settling phone-hacking claims will doubtless serve as an object lesson with respect to the
most aggressive forms of tabloid newsgathering. See News Corp's Phone Hacking Costs: $382
Million, supra note 6 (reporting that News Corp has made multi-million dollar payments to
the phone-hacking victims).
141 Moreover, one lesson to be learned from the Leveson Inquiry concerns the impact of
large, global influence-seeking "news" organizations like News International-what has
been dubbed the 'Murdoch effect." In the news context, the 'Murdoch effect" refers to
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performs journalistic functions in the digital news ecosystem are
likely to outweigh the risks overall.142
What if it turns out that, as a political matter, press reform is
too far along in Britain to fail, whatever the particular details of
its ultimate form? Now that the power of the tabloids appears to
be on the wane, the politicians can take advantage of market
reality to tame the institution with which they have had a complex
and ambivalent relationship since the late nineteenth century.
If so, then two sets of recommendations follow-the first
directed to the British press reformers and the second to the
American audience. On the British side, the Royal Charter
Recognition Panel should play its continuing certification role with
great modesty. It should hesitate to engage in ad hoc inquisitions
seeking to root out purportedly systemic ills in the press. The new
regulator's Code Committee should also be especially modest as it
seeks to draft universal journalistic norms in today's complicated
media environment. It should avoid arming the new regulator to
be a super-editor inclined to second-guess every aspect of the
outsized influence of one element of the press sector not only over government, but also via
competition and intimidation over the rest of the press industry as well. Daya Kishana
Thussu, From MacBride to Murdock: The Marketisation of Global Communication, PUBLIC,
Vol. 12, No. 3, 2005, at 55-57. Ownership regulation designed to decrease the outsize
influence of particular news and influence wielding organizations might open the field to
forward-looking and collaborative norm generation and truly voluntary self-regulation by
the multiplicity of participants in journalism today. See id. (discussing the 'Murdoch
Effect" or 'Murdochisation" of the global media). (In an analogous argument, Professor Ed
Baker has argued that media "dispersal helps avoid the danger of demagogic power-the
'Berlusconi effect.'" This is a rationale for media diversity based on its value as a
democratic safeguard. See C. Edwin Baker, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Ownership, 61
FED. COMM. L.J. 651, 655 (2009) ("[D]ispersal helps us avoid the danger of the demagogic
power-the 'Berlusconi effect.'"); C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND
DEMOCRACY 18 (2007) (noting that the "Berlusconi effect" refers to the power wielded by
Italy's richest individual, Silvio Berlusconi, over both government and media during his
lifetime).) Of course, antitrust type solutions are only part of the answer, and we should
properly worry about the extent to which limits on consolidation and cooperation would in
fact hurt an already struggling traditional media sector.
142 See generally Jonathan Zittrain, The Internet and Press Freedom, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 563, 566, 576 (2010) (describing the beneficial effect of complementary skills of
professional journalists and "interested citizen[s] ... united by the desire to get at truth" to
counteract mainstream journalists' 'loathsome convention," leading, among other things, to
lockstep refusals to publish controversial matter); Charlie Beckett, Report: The Value of
Networked Journalism, LSE POLIS (June 11, 2010), http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/POLIS/
Files/networkedjournalism.pdf (demonstrating "the increasing effectiveness and diversity of
the new forms of news production").
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journalistic task and output. It should explicitly recognize the
complexities of today's news ecosystem. Those complexities are
generated, inter alia, by: the multiplicity of participants
undertaking press functions without a single common view of the
journalistic role, the challenges to the power of the traditional
institutional press before new institutions have had sufficient time
to evolve, and the technological capacity for both massive
amplification of error and immediate self-correction. Press
reliance on the "dark arts" in newsgathering should be disciplined
more by effective enforcement of existing laws than by regulatory
intervention.
For their part, British courts engaging in jurisdiction and
choice-of-law analysis in connection with media tort claims against
non-British online news organizations should be mindful of the
beneficial role played by U.S. First Amendment exceptionalism in
the age of surveillance. Despite the significant gulf between
approaches to the proper balance between protecting free speech
and privacy interests in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Europe in any given case, press freedom and a recognition of the
democratic role of the media are shared values, the importance of
which should not be diminished.
On the American side, courts that have been veering away from
press-protective doctrines should be reminded of the dangers of
over-professionalizing journalists and hinging liability on
compliance with professional codes. To the extent that reformist
developments in Britain could provide attractive analogies
otherwise, their acontextual importation should be discouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
Press reform is currently pending in Britain. Instead of
bolstering and improving the media, however, well-intentioned
press regulation is likely to have an unintended chilling effect-
not only on British newspapers, but also on the already-struggling
American press. Worldwide government excesses in surveillance
and secrecy make it imperative today to support fearless
journalism committed to holding governments accountable. By
attempting to ensure press civility and protect victims of tabloid
newspapers in the U.K., however, British reformers may ironically
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succeed in depriving both U.S. and global audiences of a robust,
constitutionally protected reportorial safe zone for important
political coverage. Those seeking to effect British press regulation
should be sensitive to, and strongly resist, such extraterritorial
consequences.
